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Dying with the "Living" (or
"Revocable") Trust: Federal Tax
Consequences of Testamentary
Dispositions Compared
C. Douglas Miller* and R. Alan Rainey**
I. INTRODUCTION
Technically, a "living" trust is any trust created during the
lifetime of the person, known as the "grantor," who creates it. Sim-
ilarly, a "revocable" trust is any trust over which someone has di-
rect or indirect power to revoke the declaration of or transfer in
trust. In this Article, however, the term "living" or "revocable"
trust refers to its popular meaning' as a trust that the sole grantor
funds2 with his separate property and that is expressly amendable
and revocable by that grantor acting alone. Furthermore, the trust
assets are payable to the grantor upon revocation, the trust income
is payable to the grantor for life, and the trust becomes irrevocable
* Professor of Law, Graduate Program in Taxation, University of Florida. B.S., 1962,
J.D., 1965, University of Kansas; LL.M. in Taxation, 1966, New York University. Mr. Miller
is a member of the Kansas and Florida Bars, and is counsel to the firm of Miller & Rainey,
P.A., Orlando, Florida.
** Member of the Florida Bar and principal in the firm of Miller & Rainey, P.A., Or-
lando, Florida. B.A., 1974, J.D., 1977, University of Florida.
1. "The 'living trust' in the literature of estate planning usually refers to a trust which
is revocable by the settlor, acting alone." D. WEsTFA.LL, ESTATE PLANNG PRonLMAS 42 (2d
ed. 1982).
2. Frequently revocable trusts remain essentially unfunded until the death of the
grantor, at which time the trustee receives life insurance proceeds or other death benefits,
such as those payable under employee benefit plans.
3. This Article does not discuss the important tax considerations raised when the
grantor transfers community property to a revocable trust. Such a transfer raises a number
of legal issues. For example, has a conversion of the community property into the separate
property of the grantor spouse occurred? Does the death of the first spouse affect the basis
in the property? To what extent is the trust revocable by the surviving spouse? If irrevoca-
ble, has the surviving spouse made a gift for gift tax purposes? If revocable, is all of the
property included in the spouse's gross estate for estate tax purposes? For discussion of
these issues, see generally Johanson, Revocable Trusts and Community Property: The Sub-
stantive Problems, 47 Tix. L. REv. 537 (1969); Johanson, Revocable Trusts, Widow's Elec-
tion Wills, and Community Property: The Tax Problems, 47 Tax. L. Rav. 1247 (1969).
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upon the grantor's death, at which time its provisions for the even-
tual distribution of trust property to designated beneficiaries be-
come effective.
The revocable trust has become an important estate planning
device, and one that practitioners increasingly regard as a viable
alternative to the will as the principal dispositive instrument in the
estate plan.4 Indeed, practitioners perceive the revocable trust as
an alternative that has significant lifetime 5 and postdeath advan-
tages.' The perceived advantages of the revocable trust, coupled
with the further perception that its use has no important federal
tax consequences when compared to the alternative of a testamen-
tary disposition,7 contribute to its popularity and frequency of use.
4. Courts have considered challenges to the validity of the revocable trust as a testa-
mentary disposition in cases in which the grantor failed to comply with the governing stat-
ute of wills. These challenges have been unsuccessful when a formal trust instrument ex-
isted and created interests in persons other than the grantor, such as the ultimate or
remainder beneficiary. E.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113
(1944). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1959). Even when a formal
trust instrument exists, ordinarily a will-sometimes referred to as a "backup" and more
commonly referred to as a "pour-over" will-also exists to dispose of property or claims not
subject to the trust at the grantor's death. The will typically provides for a gift of the resid-
uary estate to the trustee of the revocable trust. The widespread adoption of the UNIFORM
TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUST ACT, 8 U.L.A. 125 (1983) (included in the Uniform Pro-
bate Code as § 2-511), furthered the use of pour-over wills. Previously they were valid in
some jurisdictions under the doctrines of incorporation by reference, see, e.g., Second Bank-
State St. Trust Co. v. Pinion, 341 Mass. 366, 170 N.E.2d 350 (1960), and independent legal
significance. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920
(1935).
5. The principal lifetime advantages of a revocable trust are: (1) provision for exper-
ienced or professional management of property when the grantor is not also the sole trustee;
(2) avoidance of guardianship or conservatorship proceedings in the event of the grantor's
subsequent physical or mental disability or diminished capacity; and (3) choice of that juris-
diction's laws under which to administer and interpret the trust.
6. The principal postdeath advantage of a revocable trust is avoidance of probate ad-
ministration of trust assets. Such avoidance may: (1) eliminate delays in distribution of
property to heirs; (2) reduce or eliminate costs associated with probate administration; (3)
assure a degree of privacy by avoiding proceedings of public record; (4) avoid burdensome
and expensive state probate procedure requirements, including continuing supervision of
testamentary trusts; (5) provide a nonprobate receptacle for items payable by reason of the
grantor's death, such as life insurance and other death benefits, and thus perhaps avoid
state death taxation or creditor access to such funds; and (6) eliminate or reduce claims of a
surviving spouse or of creditors generally.
For a discussion of these "advantages," including whether they indeed are advantages,
see, for example, Casner, Estate Planning-Avoidance of Probate, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 108
(1960); Moore, The Advantages of Probate, INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1 400 (1976).
7. Creation of a living revocable trust is an estate planning technique taken in gen-
eral for other than tax reasons. The action has almost no immediate tax consequences,
and is generally neutral as to taxes for the long run. The income is taxed to the donor
during his lifetime, inasmuch as he has the power to revoke. Nor are any assets trans-
812
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The purpose of this Article is to examine the federal tax con-
sequences of the revocable trust to the grantor and to his estate.
Principally due to the grantor's power to revoke the trust and re-
vest the trust assets in himself the federal tax consequences to the
grantor are in effect, if not in cause, insignificant. The perception
that creation of a revocable trust has no federal tax consequences,
therefore, is at least to that extent essentially correct, and the dis-
cussion herein is merely a summary review of the tax consequences
to the grantor upon the trust's creation and during its administra-
tion. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the federal tax consequences
to the estate can be significant, and the perception is to that extent
incorrect. These latter consequences occur with respect to both es-
tate and income taxes, but primarily with respect to income tax. In
sum, whether the decedent implements his controlling dispository
directions through a will operating upon the probate estate or
through a revocable trust operating upon its corpus will have sig-
nificant federal tax consequences.8
II. FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES UPON CREATION AND DURING
THE LIFETIME OF THE GRANTOR
The possibility exists for federal tax consequences to arise
upon the transfer of property to a revocable trust-depending for
example, on whether the grantor has made a transfer of property
by gift-and during the lifetime administration of the revocable
trust-depending, for example, on to whom items of trust income,
deduction, and credit are attributable in computing taxable in-
come. This section of the Article discusses these and other related
ferred to the trust removed from the donor's gross estate for federal estate tax pur-
poses. The power to revoke and also the retained life estate require this result. Finally,
there has been no taxable gift, again because of the retained power of revocation, there
having been no termination of the donor's dominion and control. While on the donor's
death the trust can serve as the vehicle for division into marital and residue trusts,
minimizing estate taxes on the estate of the surviving spouse, such a function could be
accomplished as well by a testamentary trust, and is not distinctive to the revocable
living trust.
Report, The Revocable Living Trust as an Estate Planning Tool, 7 REAL PROP., PROB. &
T. J. 223 (1972).
8. The general topic has been the subject of prior editorial scrutiny. For the most
notable efforts, see Covey, The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Revocable Trust in
Estate Planning, 26 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1379 (1968); Desmond, Revocable Trust After
Death of Grantor, 116 Tas. & EsTS. 218 (1977); Fleming, Taxation of Income of Grantor
Trusts After Death of Grantor and Before Implementation of Successor Trusts or Shares,
63 ILL. B.J. 78 (1974); Ufford, Income Taxation of the Funded Revocable Trust After the
Death of the Grantor, 30 TAX LAW. 37 (1976). See also Moore, supra note 6.
9. The proper tax treatment of the cost associated with the creation and lifetime ad-
1984] 813
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issues in the context of classification of tax. The discussion for now
covers only the gift and income tax effects since they are the only
federal taxes potentially imposed during the lifetime of the
grantor.
10
A. Federal Gift Tax
The transfer of property by the grantor to the revocable trust
upon or subsequent to its creation has no gift tax consequence.
This result is due to the grantor's retention of the power of revoca-
tion; the legal rationale is that any "gift" to the ultimate or re-
mainder beneficiaries remains "incomplete."11 The Treasury Regu-
lations12 long and properly have provided that a gift is complete
only as to any interest in property that the donor has "so parted
with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to revest
the beneficial title to the property in himself."I s This administra-
tive interpretation of the gift tax statute is entirely consistent with
an early expression of the same view by the United States Su-
preme Court in Burnet v. Guggenheim, 4 in which the Court, in
construing the gift tax statute, stated that "[t]he statute is not
aimed at every transfer of the legal title without consideration...
[such as] would be [true] if the trustees were to hold for the use of
the grantor.'
5
ministration of the revocable trust has federal tax consequences that may represent one
difference in the immediate tax consequences of planning for the disposition of property
through the revocable trust vehicle rather than by will. The cost of preparing a will is a
personal expense, the deductibility of which is proscribed by I.R.C. § 262. See Estate of
Pennell, 4 B.T.A. 1039 (1926). The cost of establishing a revocable trust, on the other hand,
may be deductible under I.R.C. § 212(2) as expense paid or incurred "for the management,
conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of income." See Sidney
Merians, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (concurring opinions of Scott, Fay, and Sterrett, JJ.); Nancy
Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947). Of course, trustees' commissions during administration
of the revocable trust are deductible under IRC § 212(2) except to the extent such fees are
allocable to the production of, or to property held for the production of, income that is not
includible in gross income. I.R.C. § 265 (1982); Tress. Reg. § 1.212-1(a)(2) (1960). In either
situation, the portion of the cost allocable to tax advice may be deductible under IRC §
212(3) as expenses paid or incurred "in connection with the determination, collection or
refund of any tax." See Sidney Merians, 60 T.C. 187 (1973).
10. The Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 § 401, 26 U.S.C. § 4041 (1982), repealed the
federal documentary stamp tax imposed on transfers of corporate capital stock and certifi-
cates of indebtedness. Of course, the transfer of securities to a revocable trust may occasion
state transfer taxes.
11. Tress. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b), (c), T.D. 7910, 1983-2 C.B .
12. Id.
13. Id. § 25.2511-2(c); see Rev. Rul. 54-537, 1954-2 C.B. 316.
14. 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
15. Id. at 282.
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If the grantor's power of revocation is released or otherwise
terminates during his or her lifetime, then necessarily the gifts to
the ultimate beneficiaries are complete."" Accordingly, a completed
gift will occur at the time and to the extent that trust income or
principal is actually paid to someone other than the grantor since
the grantor will have relinquished or terminated his power to re-
voke over that income or principal. 17
B. Federal Income Tax
With two potentially significant exceptions, which arise in the
context of funding the revocable trust with certain stocks and
stock options, 18 the transfer of property by the grantor to the revo-
cable trust will have no income tax consequence to the grantor.
This is due both to the grantor's power to revoke the trust and
revest the trust assets in himself'9 and to the grantor's retention of
trust income.2 0 The transfer does not constitute a sale or other tax-
able disposition of property,2' and trust income, including capital
gains or other income allocable to the corpus, remains fully taxable
to the grantor, regardless of whether the income is distributed to
16. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, reh'g denied, 308 U.S. 637 (1939);
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
17. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(0 (1958).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 24-29.
19. I.R.C. § 676 (1982); Trees. Reg. § 1.676(a)-i (1960). I.R.C. § 676 treats the grantor
as the owner of any portion of a trust in which the grantor, a nonadverse party, or both have
the power to revest in the grantor title to such portion.
20. I.R.C. § 677 (1982); Tress. Reg. § 1.677(a)-i (1960). I.R.C. § 677 treats the grantor
as the owner of any portion of the trust whose income may be distributed, held, or accumu-
lated for future distribution to the grantor or the grantor's spouse without the approval or
consent of any adverse party.
21. The transfer is not a sale or other disposition of property because the grantor does
not convert the property into cash or exchange it for other property differing materially
either in kind or extent upon transfering the property to a revocable trust. Treas. Reg §
1.1001-1(a), (d), T.D. 7213, 1972-2 C.B. 482. Accordingly, it is not necessary to except statu-
torily such transfers from the general rule of income recognition, although the assumption
underlying the statutory exceptions is applicable-the "new" property is substantially a
continuation of the "old" investment unliquidated. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1960).
Consistent with this premise, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has ruled that if a
trust that owns a residence is one under which the Code treats the grantor-occupant as the
"owner" of the trust for income tax purposes, then the occupant is the taxpayer for pur-
poses of I.R.C. § 1034. That Code section provides rules for the nonrecognition of gain in
certain cases in which the taxpayer sells one residence and, within specified time limits,
buys or builds and uses another as his principal residence. Rev. Rul. 66-159, 1966-1 C.B.
162. Similarly, the IRS also has ruled that the transfer of an installment obligation to a
revocable trust is not a "disposition" resulting in gain or loss under I.R.C. § 453. Rev. Rul.
74-613, 1974.2 C.B. 153.
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the grantor or other distributee or is accumulated by the trustee.22
Paradoxically, the statutory scheme that taxes the grantor is less
confusing than the procedure by which the Treasury implements
that scheme.2
1. Section 1244 Stock
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 1244 provides that,
subject to certain conditions and limitations, losses to an individ-
ual on the sale or exchange of "Section 1244 stock" issued to such
individual shall be treated as "ordinary" losses.2 4 The statute pro-
vides that the term "individual" does not include a trust,25 and the
Treasury Regulations state that "[a] corporation, trust, or estate is
not entitled to ordinary loss treatment under section 1244, regard-
less of how the stock was acquired."2 6 Accordingly, the transfer of
section 1244 stock to a revocable trust causes the stock to lose its
section 1244 status, with the result that any loss subsequently real-
ized is not deductible as an ordinary loss under that section.
2. Statutory Stock Option and Stock Purchase Plans
Statutory stock option and stock purchase plans27 are compen-
satory devices that confer certain tax advantages upon employees
22. I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (1982).
23. Procedurally, the IRS requires the trustee of a revocable trust that state law recog-
nizes as a trust to obtain an employer identification number no later than the grantor's first
taxable year in which the trust receives trust income. Rev. Rul. 63-178, 1963-2 C.B. 609; see
Treas. Reg. § 301.6109-1, T.D. 7670, 1980-1 C.B. 159. Trees. Reg. § 1.6109-1, T.D. 7306,
1974-1 C.B. 335. The trustee should prepare and file a skeletal fiduciary income tax return
(Form 1041), but he should not report items of income, deduction, and credit which, al-
though attributable to any portion of the trust, are treated as owned by the grantor. Rather,
he should list these items on a separate statement attached to the return. This separate
statement should include both the employer identification number of the trust and the ac-
count number of the individual grantor. Rev Rul. 63-228, 1963-2 C.B. 229; see Trees. Reg. §
1.671-4, T.D. 7796, 1981-1982 C.B. 141.
With respect to revocable trusts created on or after January 1, 1981, if the grantor is
also the sole trustee or a cotrustee and the Code treats all items of income, deduction, and
credit as owned by him, the IRS will not require the grantor-trustee either to obtain an
employer identification number for the trust or to fie a Form 1041; instead, the grantor-
trustee may include these items in his individual return, with proper notation as to nature
and source. A procedure exists whereby trustees can make revocable trusts created before
January 1, 1981, subject to these rules. See Tress. Reg. § 1.671-4 (1960); id. § 1.6012-3, T.D.
7838, 1982-2 C.B. 357; id. § 301.6109-1, T.D. 7670, 1980-1 C.B. 159.
24. I.R.C. § 1244 (1982); Trees. Reg. § 1.1244(a)-i (1960).
25. I.R.C. § 1244(d)(4) (1982).
26. Trees. Reg. § 1.1244(a)-l(b) (1960) (emphasis added).
27. I.R.C. §§ 421-425 (1982). I.R.C. § 422 concerns qualified stock options; § 422A con-
cerns incentive stock options; § 423 addresses employee stock purchase plans; and § 424
816
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who acquire their employer's stock pursuant to such stock option
or stock purchase plans. An employee who makes a disqualifying
disposition by failing to meet any of the holding period require-
ments2" loses these tax benefits. Since the Code defines the term
"disposition" as including "a transfer of legal title, '29 a transfer of
such an option, or a transfer of stock acquired by the exercise of
such an option or pursuant to such a plan, to a revocable trust
during the applicable holding period will result in the elimination
of the employee's tax benefits.
3. Other "Tax Sensitive" Assets
A grantor may transfer other "tax sensitive" assets to a revo-
cable trust without income tax consequence. These tax sensitive
assets include: Installment obligations; 0 noninterest bearing obli-
gations issued at a discount, such as series "E" bonds, or "H"
bonds acquired in a tax-free exchange;" the grantor's "principal
residence";3 2 and "small business corporation" (Subchapter S)
stock.3
3
III. FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES UPON AND AFTER THE DEATH OF
THE GRANTOR
Different possibilities of tax consequence occur upon the death
of the grantor of a revocable trust and during postdeath adminis-
tration of the revocable trust and the grantor's probate estate. Le-
gal issues that the death of the grantor raises include whether the
grantor's gross estate includes the trust assets, and whether other
estate tax consequences flow from the grantor's choice of disposi-
tive instrument. Legal issues raised during postdeath administra-
tion concern whether the income tax consequences differ depend-
ing upon which entity-the estate or the trust-is involved in a
particular transaction, and, if so, the significance of the differences.
This Article again addresses these and other questions in the con-
text of classification of tax.
deals with restricted stock options.
28. I.R.C. §§ 422(a)(1), 423(a)(1), 424(a)(1) (1982).
29. I.R.C. § 425(c)(1) (1982); Tress. Reg. § 1.425-1(c) (1966).
30. See supra note 21.
31. I.R.C. §§ 454(a), 454(c), 1037 (1982); Rev. Rul. 58-2, 1958-1 C.B. 236; IRS Letter
Ruling 7729003.
32. See supra note 21.
33. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(i) (1982). See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
1984]
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A. Estate Tax
The value of property held in a revocable trust is includible in
the grantor's gross estate for estate tax purposes. This result is due
to the grantor's retained right to the income from the trust prop-
erty, 3 4 the grantor's right to designate the beneficiaries of the trust
property and income by amending the trust, 5 and the grantor's
power to amend or revoke the trust.36 The trust property will be
included in the grantor's gross estate at its fair market value at the
date of the grantor's death 7 unless the trustee elects alternatess or
qualified use39 valuation.40 Thus, at first blush, the choice of a rev-
ocable trust instead of a will as the principal dispositive instru-
ment in the grantor's estate plan appears inconsequential for es-
tate tax purposes. Upon closer examination, however, the
possibility of some adverse tax consequence is apparent.
41
34. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a)(i), T.D. 6501, 1960-2 C.B.
271.
35. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a)(ii) (1982).
36. I.R.C. § 2038(a)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a), T.D. 6600, 1962-1 C.B. 164.
37. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1982).
38. Id. § 2032(a) (1982).
39. Id. § 2032A (1982).
40. For income tax purposes, the Code deems the trustee, or other person acquiring
trust property, as acquiring the trust property from the decedent, and the basis will be the
date-of-death fair market, alternate, or qualified use value. I.R.C. §§ 1014(a), 1014(b)(2), (3),
(9) (1982). As a result, the "constructive" more-than-one-year holding period applies to sales
or other dispositions within one year after the grantor's death. I.R.C. § 1223(11) (1982).
41. This Article generally ignores differences that typically are without tax conse-
quence. For example, I.R.C. § 2053 authorizes a deduction from the value of the gross estate
for funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims against the estate, and certain indebt-
edness. The 1939 Code limited the total allowance of such deductions to the value of prop-
erty included in the gross estate and subject to claims under state law. I.R.C. § 812(b)
(1939). To the extent that property in a revocable inter vivos trust was not subject to claims
and comprised most or a significant part of the gross estate, the potential existed for the
loss of these estate tax deductions. LR.C. § 2053(c)(2) lifted that limitation to the extent
that the executor paid such expenses before timely filing the estate tax return. I.R.C. §
2053(c)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(c), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367. Moreover, the 1939
Code did not allow the deduction of expenses incurred in administering property not sub-
ject to claims. LR.C. § 812(b) (1939). I.R.C. § 2053(b) now allows the deduction of such
expenses that the executor pays before the expiration of the I.R.C. § 6501 period of limita-
tion for assessment. I.R.C. § 2053(b) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-8(a)(1), (2) (1958). Ad-
ministration expenses include executor's commissions, attorneys' fees, and other expenses.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(b), (c), (d) (1954). Commissions and expenses of a trustee perform-
ing services normally performed by an executor are deductible expenses of administration,
but subject to the foregoing limitation if the trustee performs the services with respect to




I.R.C. section 2032(a) permits an executor to elect to deter-
mine the value of a decedent's gross estate by valuing the property
as of the date six months after death, except for property distrib-
uted, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of within that six-
month period, which is valued as of the date of distribution, sale,
exchange, or disposition.42 This advantageous method of valuation
is potentially applicable to "all the property included in the gross
estate"43 and, therefore, to property held in a revocable trust. If,
however, the revocable trust provides, as such trusts commonly do,
for the division of trust property into separate trusts upon the
death of the grantor, the division will constitute a "distribution"
for purposes of I.R.C. section 2032(a)(1)." To the extent that the
terms of the trust require the division into separate trusts upon
the death of the grantor, the distribution will occur at the grantor's
death, thus neutralizing the benefits of the alternate valuation
method as to the property held in the revocable trust.
45
2. Inclusion of Amounts Receivable by the Executor
Proceeds from those policies on the life of the decedent with
respect to which the decedent did not possess any incidents of
ownership are includible in his gross estate only to the extent "re-
ceivable by the executor."' "6 Futhermore, the Code excludes up to
$100,000 in value47 of an annuity or other payment" from a quali-
fied employee benefit plan (hereinafter "employee benefit annu-
ity") from the gross estate to the extent that such value is attribu-
table to employer contributions and is receivable "by any
beneficiary (other than the executor). 14 9 A similar rule applies to
exclude up to $100,000 in value-when aggregated with the
amounts excluded under the employee benefit annuity exclu-
42. I.R.C. § 2032(a)(1), (2) (1982).
43. I.R.C. § 2032(a) (1982).
44. Rev. Rul. 73-97, 1973-1 C.B. 404; see Tress. Reg. § 20.2032-1(c)(2), T.D. 7238,
1973-1 C.B. 544. See infra note 63 for other consequences of "distribution" status.
45. A provision in the trust instrument requiring a postponement of the division until
a date six months after the grantor's death should solve this problem. Moreover, if the trust
requires a division into "parts," as distinguished from "separate trusts," the IRS may not
consider the division a distribution. Compare Rev. Rul. 57-495, 1957-2 C.B. 616, with Rev.
Rul. 73-97, 1973-1 C.B. 404.
46. I.R.C. § 2042(1) (1982).
47. Id. § 2039(g) (1982).
48. Id. § 2039(f) (1982).
49. Id. § 2039(c) (1982).
1984]
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sion-of an annuity under an individual retirement account, indi-
vidual retirement annuity, or retirement bond (hereinafter "indi-
vidual retirement account") receivable "by any beneficiary (other
than the executor). 5 °
For purposes of determining inclusion in or exclusion from the
gross estate of the value of these property interests, the Treasury
Regulations provide that an item is deemed receivable by the exec-
utor if it is "received by or for the benefit of the estate. ' 51 The
Treasury Regulations further provide that an item is receivable for
the benefit of the estate, and thus by the executor, if payable to a
beneficiary other than the executor but subject to a legal obligation
"to pay taxes, debts, or other charges enforceable against the
estate.
,52
A revocable trust commonly directs or otherwise legally obli-
gates the trustee to pay taxes, debts, or other charges against the
estate, and makes the insurance proceeds, employee benefit annu-
ity, or individual retirement annuity payable to the trust. In such a
situation, the amounts are deemed receivable by the executor and,
therefore, included in the gross estate even though the ultimate
beneficiary is an individual or trust named in the instrument. On
the other hand, if the revocable trust merely authorizes the trustee
to pay taxes, debts, or other charges against the estate, and con-
trolling state law does not impose that obligation on the trustee,
then such amounts should not be deemed receivable by the execu-
tor, although this result is not entirely free from doubt.5 If the
revocable trust prohibits the trustee from using such amounts to
pay taxes, debts, or other charges against the estate, then such
amounts will not be deemed receivable by the executor,55 even if
the revocable trust authorizes the trustees to lend funds to and
purchase property from the estate.5
50. Id. § 2039(e) (West Supp. 1984).
51. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b)(5), T.D. 7623, 1979-1 C.B. 66; id. § 20.2042-1(a), T.D.
7761, 1981-1 C.B. 459.
52. Tress. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b)(1).
53. See, e.g., Estate of J.S. Logan, 23 B.T.A. 236 (1931), acq., 7-7-1 C.B. 279.
54. See Old Colony Trust, 39 B.T.A. 871 (1939) (insurance not receivable by the exec-
utor when payable to an inter vivos trust that authorized the trustee to pay taxes and debts
of the insured's estate; code provision exempted from the gross estate $40,000 of insurance
proceeds on the decedent's life if not receivable by the insured's executor).
55. Rev. Rul. 73-404, 1973-2 C.B. 319. In Rev. Rul. 77-157, 77-1 C.B. 279, the Treasury
stated that such a prohibition is not to achieve exemption under I.R.C. § 2039(c), but that
the estate will lose the exemption if the probate estate is insufficient to pay its taxes, debts,
or other charges.




Certain issues of United States Treasury bonds, commonly re-
ferred to as "flower" bonds, are redeemable at par-together with
accrued interest-in an amount not to exceed the estate taxes for
the purpose of applying the proceeds to the payment of those
taxes.57 To be eligible for such redemption, the bonds must have
been owned by the decedent at the time of his death and, there-
fore, included in his gross estate.58 If the trustee of a revocable
trust holds the "flower" bonds, then the trustee may redeem them
at par to pay estate taxes only if (1) the trust terminates in favor
of the estate, (2) the trustee is required to pay the estate taxes
under the terms of the trust instrument, or (3) the debts of the
estate, including costs of administration and death taxes, exceed
the assets of the probate estate.59 Accordingly, if the grantor trans-
ferred the bonds to a revocable trust that does not comply with
one of these requirements, ° no assurances can be made that the
redemption-at-par privilege will be available at the grantor's death.
B. Federal Income Tax
1. In General
Both the revocable trust and the estate become new and inde-
pendent taxpayers upon the death of the grantor-decedent.61 Both
benefits paid to a revocable inter vivos trust that permitted the trustees to lend funds to
and purchase property from the estate; citing Old Colony Trust, 39 B.T.A. 871 (1939), with
apparent approval). If the estate is insufficient to pay its taxes, debts, or other charges, the
IRS likely will characterize loans to it as distributions, thus affecting the status of amounts
used to make such loans. See Rev. Rul. 77-157, 77-1 C. B. 279.
57. Congress repealed the statutory authority, former I.R.C. § 6312, in 1971, but only
with respect to obligations issued after March 3, 1971; accordingly, outstanding issues of
United States Treasury bonds exists that are eligible for redemption at par.
58. 31 C.F.R. § 306.28 (1983). For a brief, general discussion, see Estate Planning:
Flower Bonds in Trust, 29 TAx LAw. 618 (1976).
59. 31 C.F.R. § 306.28 (1983).
60. Since a provision terminating the trust in favor of the estate would result in the
loss of many of the nontax advantages of the revocable trust, the trust instrument should
direct the trustee to tender in redemption for payment of estate taxes any eligible United
States Treasury bonds held in the trust. The effect of such a direction on the issues, dis-
cussed supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text, is open to question.
61. The first taxable period of an estate begins on the day following death. Trees. Reg.
5 1.443-1(a)(2), T.D. 7767, 1981-1 C.B. 171. The revocable trust is a "grantor trust" during
the lifetime of the grantor, and the Code treats the grantor as directly having received the
income and requires the grantor to report the income for the grantor's taxable year that the
trust realizes such items. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-3(a)(1), T.D. 6989, 1969-1 C.B. 168. Under
amendments to Treasury Regulations §§ 1.671-4, 1.6012-3, and 301.6109-1, the IRS does not
require Form 1041 (Income Tax Return for Trusts and Estates) when the same individual,
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compute taxable income "in the same manner as in the case of an
individual, except as otherwise provided in this part. The tax shall
be computed on such taxable income and shall be paid by the
fiduciary.""2
In order to implement the congressional policy of imposing
only a single tax on such income, Congress created a "conduit" sys-
tem of taxation that generally taxes estates and trusts only on in-
come not currently taxable to a beneficiary. Congress created the
conduit system by allowing a deduction to estates and trusts for
distributions to beneficiaries" to the extent of the estate's or
other than an estate or trust, is both grantor and trustee or cotrustee. The IRS treats that
individual as the owner of all trust assets by reason of a power of revocation under I.R.C. §
676. The IRS also exempts such grantor trusts from the requirements of obtaining a sepa-
rate employer identification number; instead, the IRS requires the grantor to furnish his
social security number. Upon the death of the grantor, however, the trust becomes irrevoca-
ble and, as in the case of an estate, a new taxpayer comes into existence. Rev. Rul. 57-51,
1957-1 C.B. 171; see Ufford, supra note 8. The IRS does not attribute the trust's income,
deduction, and credit items to the grantor's estate, Rev. Rul. 75-267, 1975-2 C.B. 255, since
the trust and estate are separate taxable entities.
62. I.R.C. § 641(b) (1982) (emphasis added). I.R.C. § 1(e) imposes the tax. See id. §
641(a). Although the Code taxes trusts and estates in a manner essentially equivalent to
individuals, it requires certain adjustments to taxable income. Id. § 642. Furthermore, cer-
tain tax computation elections are not available to trusts or estates. See, e.g., id. §§ 1301-
1304 (1982) (income averaging); id. § 1348 (maximum tax) (repealed for taxable years begin-
ning after December 31, 1981). As new taxpayers, both the estate and the trust must select a
taxable year, which may be a calendar year or a fiscal year of twelve months or less. Id. §§
441(b), (d), (e), 443(a)(2). The IRS does not require annualization of reported income for
short first years. Treas. Reg. § 1.443-1(a)(2) (1960). The executor selects a tax year by filing
the estate's first income tax return for the period ending on the last day of the year selected.
Id. § 1.441-1(b)(3) (1960). The executor must file the initial return within three and one-half
months of the close of the year selected. I.R.C. § 6072 (1982). As new taxpayers, both the
estate and the trust are able to adopt an accounting method that differs from the decedent's
accounting method as long as the method clearly reflects income. Id. § 446(b); Treas. Reg. §
1.446-1(a)(2), T.D. 7767, 1981-1 C.B. 171. Securing the Commissioner's approval under
LR.C. § 446(c) should not be required. Similarly no LR.C. § 481 adjustment should be avail-
able to the estate or trust when changing from the decedent's method to the estate's or
trust's new method. See Biewer v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1965), affg 41 T.C.
191 (1963). In certain circumstances the choice of accounting methods is not flexible. For
instance, if the decedent's business uses inventories and the estate or trust continues the
business, the estate or trust must use the accrual method. Biewer, 341 F.2d at 397-98. Also,
I.R.C. § 691(b) by its terms permits deductions in respect of a decedent only "when paid"
regardless of the accounting method otherwise employed.
63. The deductibility of a transfer of property by an estate or trust depends upon
whether such item transferred was either (1) an amount of fiduciary accounting income of
the trust or estate that the Code required the trust or estate to distribute currently, or (2)
any other amount that the trust or estate properly paid or credited, or that the Code re-
quired the trust or estate to distributed. I.R.C. §§ 651(a), 661(a) (1982). Payments or trans-
fers not so described are not distributions and, hence, not deductible. The most notable
nondeductible transfers are payments or transfers that meet the specific bequest or gift rule
of LR.C. § 663(a)(1). LR.C. § 663(a)(1) applies to a gift or bequest of a specific sum of
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trust's distributable net income (DNI) for the current year." The
Code does not trace the source of distributions, and, therefore, all
distributions of fiduciary accounting income or principal, including
distributions of property in kind, are deductible by the estate or
trust in computing taxable income. Corresponding provisions pro-
vide that the DNI for which a deduction is allowed to the estate or
trust is the amount that the beneficiary must include in his gross
income.65 The "tax character" of the amounts realized by the es-
tate or trust flows through to the beneficiary.6 6 In general terms,
then, and at the risk of oversimplification, under I.R.C. Subchapter
J, trusts and estates are essentially "conduits" through which the
money or specific property that the grantor pays or credits in three or fewer installments.
The Treasury Regulations deem bequests under a will that does not specify a time of pay-
ment as required to be paid in single installments. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(c)(iii) (1960). A
"marital deduction formula pecuniary bequest" does not fall within the exception as a be-
quest of a specific sum of money, and, hence, will qualify as a distribution deduction. Id. §
1.663(a)-(1)(b); see also Rev. Rul. 72-295, 1972-1 C.B. 197. The distribution rules also do not
apply to money or property passing by operation of law outside of the estate or trust di-
rectly to the owner, heir, legatee, or devisee. See Tress. Reg. § 1.663(a)-(1)(c)(1)(ii) (1960).
For instance, payments to a creditor qua creditor do not constitute a distribution, even if
the creditor is also a beneficiary. See, e.g., Mariani v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 135 (1970);
Early v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 560 (1969), rev'd, 445 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 855 (1971). Nor does the term encompass dower or statutory rights in lieu of dower.
Rev. Rul. 71-167, 1971-1 C.B. 163, modifying Rev. Rul. 64-101, 1964-1 C.B. 77. Payments to
widows for support allowances, whether from income or corpus, however, are estate distribu-
tions. Rev. Proc. 73-4, 1973-1 C.B. 751; see also Rev. Rul. 75-124, 1975-1 C.B. 183 (payments
of widows' and dependents' support allowances are dedutible as distributions even though
local law considers such payments debts). The distribution provisions do not include life
insurance proceeds payable to the decedents estate if, as under the statutes of some states,
such proceeds inure directly to the surviving spouse and children and are free from credi-
tors' claims. Estate of Flick v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1948); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Valz, 141 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1944); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 222.12 (1983).
64. Distributable net income (DNI) is the taxable income of the trust or estate with
certain modifications. I.R.C. § 643(a) (1982). The most notable modification is that the Code
excludes capital gains from DNI, except in certain circumstances. Id. § 643(a)(3). When the
Code excludes capital gains from DNI, distributions to beneficiaries cannot generate a de-
duction to offset the capital gains. Thus, unless distributions attract DNI that includes capi-
tal gains, the trust or estate will pay on the capital gains. This rule's rationale assumes that
capital gains generally are attributable to principal items and, therefore, generally are not
distributable to income beneficiaries. Other significant modifications include ignoring the
dividend exclusion, see id. § 643(a)(7), including tax exempt interest, see id. § 643(a)(5), and
ignoring amounts qualifying for a charitable deduction under I.R.C. § 647(c). See id. §
663(a)(2); Tress. Reg. § 1.663(a)-2 (1960); see also Mott v. United States, 462 F.2d 512 (Ct.
CL 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Rev. RuL 68-667, 1968-2 C.B. 289.
65. I.R.C. §§ 652, 662 (1982). Amounts distributed in excess of DNI are tax free. See
id. § 102(a). An exception to this tax free treatment would be a distribution from a trust
that constitutes an accumulation distribution of undistributed net income for a preceeding
taxable year. This exception is codified in the Code's "throwback" rules. See id. §§ 665-668.
The throwback rules do not apply to estates. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
66. LR.C. §§ 652(b), 662(b) (1982); Tress. Reg. § 1.643(a)-0 (1960).
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income tax liability for the taxable income that the trust or estate
earned is allocated between the beneficiaries on the one hand and
the estate or trust on the other hand, depending on whether the
trustee distributed amounts to the beneficiaries or retained them
in the trust or estate during the current year.1
7
2. Accumulation of Income During Administration
An executor may seek to minimize the total income tax bur-
den on the taxable income earned during the interim period of es-
tate administration by engaging in postmortem planning.6 8 Be-
cause an estate is a separate taxable entity, postmortem income
tax planning often necessitates continuing the existence of the es-
tate as a separate taxable entity for as long as possible. 9 If the
executor accumulates some or all of the income earned on estate
assets and the Code thus taxes that income to the estate, the estate
and beneficiaries may pay a lesser aggregate tax than they would if
the executor distributed all of the income to the beneficiaries, who
would have to report it in their individual income tax returns. °
67. For a thorough discussion of this complex area of taxation, see M. FERGUSON, J.
FREELAND, & R. STEPHENS, FEDmL INcoME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFIcIARIEs (1970);
D. KAHN & E. COLSON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, GuFrS AND TRUSTS (2nd ed. 1975).
68. See Giles, The Application of Certain Rules of Federal Income Taxation: Bracket
Splitting, Multiple Trusts, Trapping Distributions, and Basis Adjustments, 37 INST. ON
FED. TAX'N ch. 40 (1979); Walsh, Postmortem Estate Planning, 37 INST. ON FED. TAX'N ch.
44 (1979).
69. The Treasury Regulations deem an estate terminated when the executor has dis-
tributed all assets except for a reasonable good faith reserve for unascertainable or contin-
gent liabilities (not including claims by a beneficiary). Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1960). If
the executor unreasonably prolongs the administration of the estate beyond a reasonable
period for performance of all duties of administration, the Commissioner may treat the es-
tate as terminated. Id. Courts have disregarded for federal tax purposes capricious delay in
closing an estate. Old Va. Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1966); Chick v.
Commissioner, 166 F.2d 337 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 845 (1948); Manufacturers'
Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 410 F.2d 767 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Rev. Rul. 66-266, 1966-2
C.B. 356. Reasonable grounds for continuation of an estate have prevented termination. See
Wylie v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Tex. 1968)(litigation of nominal claims for
eight years); McCauley v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Ark.), appeal dismissed,
295 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1961) (prosecution of tax refund); Carsen v. United States, 317 F.2d
370 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (trustee used income to pay claims for 18 years rather than selling valua-
ble assets); Rev. RuL 76-23, 1976-1 C.B. 264 (payment of estate tax in ten annual install-
ments under old I.R.C. § 6166 for purposes of retaining Subchapter S status).
70. The rates applicable to trusts and estates are found in LR.C. § 1(e), introduced by
the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126 (1977).
These rates are higher than the rates for individuals. When income earned and accumulated
by the estate will be substantially less than the total income of the beneficiaries if such
income were distributed, however, accumulation and payment of the income tax by the es-
tate may still result in tax savings. The ability to accumulate estate income depends on the
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Permanent tax savings result since the executor later can dis-
tribute the accumulated income to high bracket beneficiaries with-
out additional tax cost.
7 1
The trustee of a revocable trust also may seek to utilize the
revocable trust as a separate taxable entity. The ability of the trus-
tee of a revocable trust to accumulate income at the trust's lower
bracket during the interim period of administration depends on
whether, and for how long, the trust continues as a taxable entity,
and, if the trust is continuing, whether the trust instrument gives
the trustee the power to accumulate income or instead requires
him to distribute the income.
(a) Continuance of the Trust as a Tax Entity
Distribution requirements in revocable trust instruments can
create uncertainty concerning the continuance of the trust as a tax
entity. Often, the trust instrument provides either for a "distribu-
tion" of trust assets to the ultimate beneficiaries "upon the gran-
tor's death" or "immediately upon receipt of the assets from the
estate," or for an immediate "division" of the trust principal
among those beneficiaries. In such situations an implication may
arise that the grantor's death has terminated the revocable trust. If
the revocable trust has terminated, the Treasury Regulations re-
quire the ultimate beneficiaries of the revocable trust, whether in-
dividuals or subsidiary trusts, and not the revocable trust itself, to
lack of a directive contained in the will or a provision of state law that requires the executor
to distribute income currently to the beneficiaries of the estate during administration. See
generally M. FERGUSON, J. FREEAND, & R. STMHENS, supra note 67, at 407-26. A directive
in the will to distribute the income of the estate currently during administration may be
ineffective to compel immediate distribution. See Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d
431 (6th Cir. 1948); see also FL.& STAT. § 733.801 (1983) (no personal representative of an
estate shall be required to pay any amount to any beneficiary until five months after grant-
ing of letters). Occasionally, all or a part of an estate's income may be currently distributa-
ble. In such situations, the Code requires the executor to deduct the income from the estate,
see, e.g., United States v. James, 333 F.2d 748 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964)
(court ordered the estate to pay a widow's allowance from the income of the estate); see also
Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Donnelly, 121 F. Supp 179 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 214 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.
1954) (under Louisiana law, dividends accruing on corporate stocks that are the subject of a
bequest belong to the specific legatee when the estate earns such dividends). Generally,
however, in contrast to the Donnelly decision, income accruing on specific property that
itself is the subject of a special bequest belongs to the beneficiary only ultimately, and the
IRS does not require the estate to make the distribution currently. In such situations, the
IRS does not require the estate to deduct currently the amount ultimately payable to the
beneficiary until the year actually distributed, subject to the DNI calculations for the year
of distribution. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.661(b)-1, 1.662(b)-i (1960).
71. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
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include in gross income the amount of income currently realized by
the trust: "If a trust ... is considered terminated under this sec-
tion for Federal income tax purposes ... the gross income, deduc-
tions and credits of the trust are, subsequent to the termination,
considered the gross income, deductions and credits of the person
or persons succeeding to the property of the .. trust.
'7 2
Recognizing that the issue of termination ought not be deter-
mined solely by reason of trust provisions requiring "immediate"
distribution or division upon the grantor's death, the Treasury
Regulations provide:
Generally, the determination of whether a trust has terminated depends upon
whether the property held in trust has been distributed to the persons enti-
tled to succeed to the property upon termination of the trust rather than
upon the technicality of whether or not the trustee has rendered his final
accounting. A trust does not automatically terminate upon the happening of
the event by which the duration of the trust is measured. A reasonable time
is permitted after such event for the trustee to perform the duties necessary
to complete the administration of the trust. Thus, if under the terms of the
governing instrument, the trust is to terminate upon the death of the life
beneficiary and the corpus is to be distributed to the remainderman, the trust
continues after the death of the life beneficiary for a period reasonably neces-
sary to a proper winding up of the affairs of the trust.7 3
Timing the termination of an estate or trust to the advantage
of the interested parties is a complex tax planning transaction;
7'
loss of the opportunity to engage in such planning due to a prema-
ture, and perhaps unknown, termination of the revocable trust is a
serious matter.75 Accordingly, revocable trust instruments ordina-
72. Tress. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(d) (1960).
73. Id. § 1.641(b)-3(b).
74. A judicious choice of the termination date can prevent "bunching" of trust income
in the beneficiaries' returns. The DNI attracted by distributions to beneficiaries is includible
by the beneficiary for any taxable year or years of the trust or estate ending within or with
the beneficiary's taxable year. I.R.C. § 662(c) (1982). Upon termination of an estate or trust,
the taxable year is closed. Id. § 441(b)(3). In those years in which the interim trust or estate
continues, the beneficiaries only have to include amounts in their gross income attributable
to one estate or trust taxable year. In the year of estate or trust termination, however, two
trust or estate taxable years may end within the beneficiary's taxable year, resulting in as
much as twenty-three months of fiscal year estate or trust DNI bunched into one of the
beneficiary's taxable years. Id. § 662(c); see Schemberg v. United States, 365 F.2d 70 (7th
Cir. 1966); see also Rev. Rul. 71-180, 1971-1 C.B. 205. Timing of the termination date is also
critical in the "pass-through" of excess estate or trust deductions to beneficiaries. See LR.C.
§ 642(h) (1982); see also Westphal v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 340 (1961). See generally M.
F!RGUSON, J. FRFANs, & R. STEHENS, supra note 67.
75. As a practical matter, an accurate physical division or distribution of the revocable
trust assets usually is not possible immediately after the grantor's death, especially when
revocable trust beneficiaries are subsidiary trusts, such as a marital deduction trust, whose
size is determined by a formula. Certain elections available to the fiduciaries can affect the
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rily should provide for the continued existence of the trust during
the "interim" phase. 7' Trust provisions requiring distribution or
relative size of shares; among them the most notable is the election to utilize administration
expenses as income tax deductions rather than as estate tax deductions. See Tress. Reg. §
642(g) (1982). See generally R. CovEY, THE MArrAL DEDucION AND THE USE OF FORMULA
PROVISIONS (2d ed. 1978). Also, when the revocable trust assets may be subject to a call by
the estate for payment of debts, claims, and taxes of the decedent, the ultimate size of
distributions may not be immediately ascertainable. Accordingly, a premature termination
of the interim trust would result in income earned by trust assets during the administration
phase being automatically includible in the returns of the beneficiaries, thus requiring the
beneficiaries to report such income in their own returns for a period in which they may not
have received dollars or property with which to pay the income tax liability. Moreover, if
the trustee later distributes trust assets in percentages that differ from earlier estimates
used to report the income by the beneficiaries, then tax deficiencies for some beneficiaries
and tax refunds for others will result. See LR.C. §§ 6211, 6401, 6501, and 6511 (1982). A
premature termination of the interim trust could result in other serious adverse collateral
tax consequences. When the trustee actually divides trust assets into shares and distributes
them soon after the grantor's death, the asset values may become fixed for purposes of
estate tax on the distribution date without regard to the alternate valuation date. See id. §
2032; Rev. Rul. 73-97, 1973-1 C.B. 404. But see Rev. Rul. 57-495, 1957-2 C.B. 616 (when the
trustee is merely dividing property among separate shares no such disposition occurs under
I.R.C. § 2032). See generally Moore, supra note 6,11 400-401. Also, when one or more of the
beneficiaries of the terminated revocable trust is a subsidiary trust that by its terms re-
quires the trustee to distribute currently the income that the trust receives-for instance, a
power of appointment marital deduction trust-the postmortem option to utilize adminis-
trative expenses as income tax, rather than estate tax, deductions may be partially lost. This
would occur if one share or subsidiary trust-for instance, a residuary trust-and not an-
other-for instance, the marital-were to pay all administrative expenses. If income earned
on the trust assets is immediately divisible between the subsidiary trusts according to their
relative sizes, the risk increases that administrative expenses will exceed taxable income
allocated to the particular subsidiary trust. There is no carryover of excess administrative
expenses, and to the extent not allowed against the current year's income, they are wasted
for income tax purposes. The estate could claim the excess deductions on its estate tax
return. To be deductible on the estate tax return, however, the executor must pay the ex-
penses within three years from the filing of the estate tax return if the trust property is not
subject to probate claims. Tress. Reg. §§ 20.2053-1, 20.2053-8 (1958). Trustee commissions
may not be deductible on the estate tax return even if the trust property is subject to
claims, unless and to the extent that a trustee is "in fact performing services with respect to
property subject to claims which would normally be performed by an executor." Id. §
20.2053-3(b)(3).
76. The trust instrument could provide:
As soon as is conveniently possible after Grantor's death, but subject to proper
provisions being made for all of the obligations, payments, and distributions described
above (relating to special duties of the Trustee arising upon Grantor's death), then
(i) all of the property of the original Trust Estate hereunder, both income
and principal,
(ii) all insurance policies and proceeds and other benefits of any kind to the
extent receivable by the Trustee of the original Trust hereunder, and
(iii) all prcperties which are receivable by such Trustee under the provisions
of Grantor's last will and testament, Grantor's revocable trust(s), or by the exer-
cise of any power of appointment,
shall be disposed of in the following manner.
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division "upon the grantor's death" or "immediately upon receipt
of the assets from the estate" should not be construed as causing
termination, but rather as serving to establish a point in time for
measuring the relative shares of the different beneficiaries. None-
theless, as a precautionary measure, provision for the trust's con-
tinuance would be wise.
(b) Whether Trust Income Can Be Accumulated
The determination of whether the trustee can accumulate
trust income or must distribute it currently depends
upon the terms of the trust instrument and the applicable local law .... [If
a trust cannot accumulate income] the fiduciary must be under a duty to
distribute the income currently even if, as a matter of practical necessity, the
income is not distributed until after the close of the trust's taxable year.
If the revocable trust requires the trustee to distribute all in-
come currently, then the utility of the trust as a separately taxed
accumulation vehicle diminishes. The central test for determining
whether a trustee has a duty to distribute income currently is
whether the beneficiary has the present right to compel immediate
distribution.7 8 This test is distinct from the issue of whether the
beneficiary has the ultimate right to receive the income, or whether
he actually receives the income. If the trustee has a duty to dis-
tribute the trust income currently, the beneficiary of the trust
must include in gross income for the taxable year the amount of
income that the trust instrument requires to be distributed cur-
rently, whether or not the trustee distributes the income.
7 9
The lack of a specific provision requiring current distribution
of income is not conclusive if a duty otherwise exists. State law,
however, generally specifies that an executor of an estate does not
have a duty to distribute estate income currently,80 and serious
doubt exists on the question of whether a will can effectively re-
quire distribution of estate income prior to satisfaction of claims.1
(i) .. .;and
(ii) ...;
and when all of the properties of the original Trust hereunder have been thus disposed
of, it shall be deemed terminated.
77. Tress. Reg. § 1.651(a)-2(a) (1960).
78. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 42 (1934).
79. I.R.C. §§ 652(a), 662(a)(2)(A) (1982).
80. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.801 (West 1976).
81. See, e.g., Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1948); see also
supra note 132. One rationale is that such distributions could result in imposition of per-
sonal liability for "debts" (taxes) that the decedent owes the United States. See 31 U.S.C.
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The Treasury Regulations acknowledge these limitations on the
executor's power to distribute income in their framework for deter-
mining whether an interest in property passing from a decedent to
his surviving spouse is a deductible interest for purposes of the es-
tate tax marital deduction.
8 2
The legal basis for the proposition that the beneficiaries of an
estate do not have a present right to estate income is of dubious
import on whether the trustee of a revocable trust that is silent on
the issue has discretion to accumulate trust income.83 Nevertheless,
when the trustee of a revocable trust has a duty to perform "execu-
tor-like" tasks-for example, paying funeral expenses, attorneys'
fees, appraisers' fees, debts, and taxes-the estate analogy conceiv-
ably applies, in which event the trustee of the revocable trust es-
sentially has the power to accumulate income.
Little authority exists concerning whether states will analogize
between the estate executor and the trustee with "executor-like"
tasks and accordingly grant the trustee the power to accumulate
income. The issue rarely arises other than in a federal income tax
setting, although it has arisen with mixed results in cases in which
a state statute prohibited accumulation of income8 and in cases in
which creditors attempted to levy on the beneficiaries' rights to in-
come after a terminating event but prior to the final accounting.8 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Commissioner v. First Trust & Deposit Co.88 supports the
3713 (1982); Tress. Reg. §§ 20.2002-1, 1.641(b)-2(a), T.D. 6580, 1961-2 C.B. 123; see also
Miller, The Fiduciary's Personal Liability for Deficiencies in Federal Income, Gift and Es-
tate Taxes of a Decedent or Decedent's Estate, 11 GONZ. L. REv. 431 (1976).
82. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(9) (1958) (the interest does not fail to satisfy the
conditions of deductibility because the law does not entitle the spouse to income from estate
assets for the period before distribution unless a court authorizes a delay beyond the period
reasonably required for administration). Revenue Ruling 76-446, 1976-2 C.B. 295, indicates
that the result may be different if the marital deduction bequest is contained in a revocable
trust, unless the payment of income is "delayed because of the trust's interrelation with the
administration of the settlor's probate estate." See R. CovEY, supra note 75, at 140-41.
83. The Code limits a trustee's potential personal liability for "debts" the decedent
owed the United States to the value of the trust property at the grantor's death. I.R.C. §
6324(a)(2) (1982).
84. See, e.g., Bryant v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 127, af'd, 185 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1950).
85. See, e.g., Derring v. Pierce, 149 A.D. 10, 133 N.Y.S. 582 (1912) (a creditor of a
remainderman may not levy execution upon the trust property after the terminating event
but before the trustee accounts).
86. 41 B.TA. 107 (1940), aff'd, 118 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1941). For a discussion of this
case, see Covey, supra note 8, at 1395-1396; Fleming, supra note 8, at 82; Ufford, supra note
8, at 43-44. The First Trust & Deposit case, which dealt with the uncertain amounts of
distributions, is distinguishable from those situations in which the beneficiaries' identities
are not certain. The inability to ascertain the beneficiaries' identities does not preclude the
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proposition that the trustee of a revocable trust has the power to
accumulate income and, therefore, supports the corollary that for
income tax purposes the trust income is not currently distributa-
ble. In First Trust & Deposit Co., the trust instrument provided
that upon the grantor's death the trustee was to pay income to the
grantor's wife, for life, and upon her death the trustee was to dis-
tribute the principal equally among the children. The trust re-
quired the trustee to pay all estate taxes due on account of the
grantor's death. When the grantor and his wife died in a common
disaster, the trustee collected the insurance and paid the estate
taxes over a five-year period of administration. The trustee accu-
mulated income during this period. The IRS brought an action
against the beneficiaries requiring them to include the trust in-
come in their individual returns even though the trustee had not
distributed the income to them. In holding that the income that
the trustee collected for the years in question was taxable to the
trust and not to the beneficiaries, the Second Circuit placed great
emphasis on the "executor-like" duties imposed on the trustee:
Under the terms of the trust deed the gift to the children, which became
vested on the death of their parents, was subject to the payment of taxes,
commissions and expenses incident to the winding up of the trust. There was
no duty on the part of the fiduciary to make periodical distributions of cur-
rent income to the children and distribution of either income or principal
could only be compelled after an accounting .... [We previously have said]
that "income to be distributed currently" is income directed by a will or deed
to be currently distributed and that the words presuppose a periodic duty on
the part of the trustee. The situation here resembles that of an estate in the
course of administration where the income pending settlement is returnable
by the executor, and is not regarded as the income of the legatees or next of
kin .... Until completion by the trustee of its duties the income was that of
the trust and not of the remaindermen and taxable to the trustee
accordingly.
87
(c) Resolving the Issue
If empowering the trustee of a revocable trust to accumulate
income during the "estate administration" period is desirable, and
it ordinarily would seem to be, the trust instrument should clearly
so provide. A variety of methods could accomplish this result, but
one method would be to provide for the existence of an "interim"
trust for the "estate administration" period. The trust instrument
would not require current distribution of income from this trust,
trust from distributing income. United States v. Higginson, 238 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1956);
Rev. Rul. 62-147, 1962-2 C.B. 151. But see Estate of Bruchmann, 53 T.C. 403 (1969).
87. First Trust & Deposit Co., 118 F.2d at 452.
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but rather would authorize discretionary distributions to fund any
subsidiary trusts and interim distributions to other trust benefi-
ciaries. Given such a trust instrument, the postmortem income tax
planning opportunities available to the estate clearly should be
available to the revocable trust.
3. Other Income Tax Differences Between the Estate and the
Revocable Trust During Administration
The questionable availability of the revocable trust as a sepa-
rate tax entity having the ability to accumulate income is not the
only potential point of departure in the comparison between the
revocable trust and the estate during the "estate administration"
period, although it is a significant one. Other significant issues and
differences exist, the most important of which this Article now
addresses.
(a) Personal Exemption
The Internal Revenue Code allows an estate a personal ex-
emption, in lieu of the personal exemptions provided by I.R.C. sec-
tion 151, of $600 in computing taxable income.88 The Code, how-
ever, limits the revocable trust either to a deduction of $100 if it is
a "complex" trust-that is, one that can accumulate income or dis-
tribute corpus-or to a $300 deduction if it is a "simple"
trust-that is, all of its income is required to be distributed
currently.89
(b) Installment Payments of Income Taxes
An estate may pay its income tax in four equal installments
without interest;90 accordingly, the estate can invest the deferred
taxes during the deferral period and thereby create additional
wealth. This opportunity is unavailable to the revocable trust,
which must pay its tax with the return.9 1
88. I.R.C. § 642(b) (1982).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 6152(a) (1982).





I.R.C. section 167 allows as a deduction for income tax pur-
poses a "reasonable allowance" for depreciation. 2 I.R.C. section
642 allows the deduction for depreciation to an estate or trust only
to the extent not allowable to estate or trust beneficiaries under
section 167(h).93 With respect to estates and beneficiaries of estates
the Code allocates the depreciation deduction on the basis of in-
come of the estate allocable to each beneficiary.9 4 With respect to
trusts the rule is quite different. The Code first allocates the de-
preciation deduction to the trustee to the extent the trust docu-
ment requires the trustee to retain a reserve for depreciation out of
income or to the extent the trustee actually retains for such pur-
poses where state law or the trust document permits the retention
of such a reserve. The Code allocates any remaining depreciation
among the trust and trust beneficiaries in proportion to the
amount of income in excess of the reserve allocated to each. 5
Thus, when a will or trust requires or permits the executor or trus-
tee to set aside a reserve for depreciation out of income, the alloca-
tion of the depreciation deduction for income tax purposes will de-
pend on whether the estate or a revocable trust is the relevant
entity.
(d) Charitable Deduction
Under I.R.C. section 642(c) an estate may deduct amounts
permanently set aside for charity. 6 Trusts may take a deduction
only for amounts actually paid to charity; no provision exists for a
permanent "set aside" deduction.97
92. In the case of "recovery property" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 168 (Accelerated
Cost Recovery System), the deduction allowed by I.R.C. § 168 is a reasonable allowance
under § 167.
93. I.R.C. § 642(e) (1982).
94. The term "income" appearing in § 167(h) probably means fiduciary accounting
income within the meaning of I.R.C. § 643(b). Rules similar to the depreciation rules apply
for the depletion allowance. See I.R.C. § 611(b) (1982).
95. Id. § 167(h) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(h)-1(c) (1960) (estates); Treas. Reg. §
1.167(h)-1(b) (1960) (trusts).
96. I.R.C. § 642(c)(2) (1982); Trees. Reg. § 1.642-(c)(2) T.D. 7387, 1975-2 C.B. 244.
The deduction is in lieu of the charitable deduction under LR.C. § 170(a).
97. The trustee, however, may elect the deduction for a taxable year when the actual
payment occurs in the following taxable year. I.R.C. § 642(c)(1) (1982).
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(e) Charitable Remainder Trusts
A revocable trust may establish a charitable remainder trust
upon completion of the "estate administration" period. For chari-
table remainder annuity or unitrust status, with its attendant ex-
emption from income tax and qualification for the estate tax chari-
table deduction, the trust instrument specifically must create a
new trust rather than merely continue the old." The Code does
not impose a similar requirement for charitable remainder trusts
created under a will.
(f) Recognition of Losses
I.R.C. section 267 disallows an otherwise deductible loss aris-
ing out of a sale or exchange transaction between a revocable trust
and a beneficiary of such trust." This rule of disallowance does not
apply to transactions between an estate and its beneficiaries. 00
Postmortem in-kind funding distributions in satisfaction of a fixed
obligation can result in realization of gain or loss to the trust or
estate.101 A loss realized by a revocable trust making an in-kind
distribution, however, would be disallowed as a deduction, whereas
any such loss realized by an estate would be allowed.103
(g) Subchapter S
When a decedent dies owning stock of a Subchapter S corpo-
ration, his estate may continue to hold the stock without termina-
tion of Subchapter S status during the probate period.03 Upon ter-
mination of the estate, the beneficiaries receiving the Subchapter S
stock must be qualified shareholders for the election to continue.'
°4
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(a)(4); id. § 1.664-1(a)(6); see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-395, 1972-2
C.B. 340.
99. LR.C. § 267 (1982).
100. Id.
101. See Tress. Reg. § 1.10144(a)(3) (1960); Rev. RuL 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286; Rev.
Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 C.B. 325.
102. When I.R.C. § 267 disallows a loss, subsequent gain realized by the taxpayer on
sale of the asset may go unrecognized to the extent of the previously disallowed loss. See
I.C. § 267(d) (1982).
103. Id. § 1361(b)(1)(B) (1982).
104. The permissible shareholders include:
(i) resident aliens or United States citizen individuals, LR.C. § 1361(b); or
(ii) trusts, but only for 60 days, LR.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)
(iii) unless any such trust is either
(a) described in I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) (but only for a maximum two year
period following such grantor's death); or
(b) a qualified Subschapter S trust described in LR.C. § 1361(d).
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A grantor may fund a revocable trust with Subchapter S stock dur-
ing his life,105 but the trustee must distribute that stock to a per-
missible shareholder within two years following the grantor's
death.10 6 When distribution of Subchapter S stock is not desirable
until after the "estate administration" phase, the estate appears to
allow more flexibility in Subchapter S stock distributions than
does the revocable trust.
10 7
(h) Separate Share Rule
The Code treats substantially separate and independent
shares of different beneficiaries in a single trust as separate trusts
for the purposes of computing DNI,10 which insulates one benefi-
ciary from taxes on income accumulated for another beneficiary.109
Separate share treatment is mandatory for trusts, °110 but does not
apply to estates."1 Although this "separate share" rule for trusts
ordinarily would be an advantage, and its inapplicability to estates
a disadvantage,11 2 it may be advantageous in certain situations for
an estate or trust to make non-pro rata distributions, and thus give
low bracket taxpayers such as subsidiary trusts a greater portion of
the trust income. The separate share rule, however, effectively pro-
hibits a revocable trust from making such distributions.113
(i) Sixty-Five Day Rule
A trustee may elect to treat distributions within the first sixty-
five days of a taxable year as occurring during the preceeding taxa-
ble year. 114 This advantageous "look back" rule is available to a
revocable trust, but is not available to estates.
105. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(i) (1982).
106. Id. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii). If the entire corpus is not included in the grantor's gross
estate the trustee must distribute the stock within 60 days-not within two years.
107. Although a shareholder's estate is a qualified "S" shareholder, it may not hold
the stock indefinitely. Once the estate has performed its ordinary duties, it may be termi-
nated for federal income tax purposes, regardless of whether probate continues under local
law. See Old Va. Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1966).
108. I.R.C. § 663(c) (1982); Tress. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3, T.d. 7633, 1979-2 C.B. 247.
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-i(a) (1960).
110. Id. § 1.663(c)-1(d).
111. Id. § 1.663(c)-3(f).
112. Cf. Harkness v. United States, 469 F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
820 (1973).
113. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.




Generally, amounts that an estate or trust distributes in excess
of its DNI are not includible in the gross income of the estate or
trust beneficiary. " 5 To foreclose the tax avoidance opportunities
this rule could present, Congress created a statutory scheme-the
so-called "throwback" rules-that does tax certain amounts dis-
tributed in excess of DNI.116 The throwback rules are not applica-
ble to estates,117 nor are they applicable, generally, to a trust in a
year in which it is a simple trust." 8 A revocable trust that does not
require distribution of all of its income currently is not a simple
trust and, therefore, is subject to the throwback rules.
In theory, the throwback rules tax the beneficiary of a trust
that accumulates income as if the beneficiary received the income
in the year the trust earned and accumulated it.'" In operation,
such rules would require inclusion of the accumulated income in
115. See id. § 662(a) (1982); id. § 102(b) (1982).
116. I.R.C. §§ 665-668 (1982).
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.665(a)-OA(d) (1972). During the debates on the 1954 Code, which
first introduced the throwback rules into the trust income taxation scheme, a Senate Report
noted:
In spite of the "65-day and 12-month rules" of existing law, it is still possible to
shift the tax burden in part from a beneficiary to a trust. For example, if the distribu-
tion of trust income for one year is deferred to a date more than 65 days after the
beginning of the following year, and the trust income for the following year is distrib-
uted within the first 65 days after the end of that year, the beneficiary is taxable to the
extent of the trust income for the second year only, even though he received all the
income for both years. The purpose of the "throwback rule" is to close this tax-avoid-
ance loophole in the existing law.
To meet this and similar situations, distributions by a trust in excess of its distrib-
utable net income for the current taxable year will be "thrown back" to each of the 5
preceding years in reverse order and will be taxed to the beneficiaries to the extent that
the distributable net income of . . . [certain prior] . . . years was not, in fact,
distributed.
To prevent double taxation, the beneficiaries receive a credit for any taxes previ-
ously paid by the trust which are attributable to the excess so thrown back. However,
the beneficiaries are deemed to have received their share of the tax paid by the trust on
this excess. In effect, the beneficiaries, except for the fact that they report the income
currently, are placed in the same position as if the trust made the distribution at the
time it received the income .... [The] throwback provisions ... [do] not apply to
estates or generally to simple trusts.
SENAT REPORT No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1954).
Clearly, Congress did not regard estates as presenting significant opportunities for tax
avoidance through the use of accumulation distributions; apparently, this reasoning contin-
ues since estates remain immune to the throwback rules. The probable basis for this policy
decision is the relatively short life of estates. Trusts generally have a longer life span, and,
hence, greater potential for tax avoidance through accumulation distributions.
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.665(a)-OA(a)l (1972).
119. Id.
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the beneficiary's income for the taxable year during which the
trust earned and accumulated it and a recomputation of the resul-
tant tax liability. In practice, however, the throwback rules impose
a partial tax on the undistributed net income (UNI) in the year of
distribution. The Code requires the trustee to compute the partial
tax at the beneficiaries' rates using a special five year average ar-
rangement. From a tax planning perspective, if the throwback tax
liability incurred upon a subsequent distribution does not exceed
the tax liability otherwise incurred on a current distribution by
more than the net after-tax benefit from the accumulation of earn-
ings on the amount of the deferred tax, then the tax planner will
achieve an economic advantage. Often, however, an economic dis-
advantage will result, due to higher marginal tax rates applicable
to the beneficiary's taxable income in the distribution year.
Not all distributions from a revocable trust are subject to a
throwback tax. Without triggering a throwback tax, a revocable
trust can: accumulate and subsequently distribute capital gains;120
distribute what otherwise would be UNI, if the accumulation oc-
curred prior to the twenty-first birthday of the beneficiary; 21 dis-
tribute current fiduciary accounting income, as defined in I.R.C.
section 643(b), even if the income is in excess of current DNI; 2
and distribute to a subsidiary trust that, prior to the distribution,
was not in existence.
1 23
Due to the complexity and potentially significant tax conse-
quences of the throwback rules, the tax planner must consider
120. I.R.C. § 643(a)(1) generally excludes capital gains from DNI.
121. I.R.C. § 665(b) (1982).
122. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 introduced an exception to the unlimited throwback
rule by providing that if "amounts properly paid, credited, or required to be distributed by
the trust for the taxable year do not exceed the income of the trust for such year, there shall
be no accumulation distribution for such year." Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 701(b), (c), I.R.C.
§ 665(b) (1982) (effective for tax years commencing after December 31, 1975). Apparently,
distributions may include amounts which otherwise would effect an accumulation distribu-
tion but for the fact that the distribution does not exceed trust income. See I.R.C. § 643(b)
(1982) (fiduciary accounting incoxie or trust income). Clearly principal distributions or dis-
tributions of income accumulated from prior years pass out to the beneficiaries without trig-
gering a throwback distribution if the distributions fall within this exception. See generally
Hirshson, Accumulation Trusts and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 1 Rv. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS
291 (1977); Link & Wahoshe, Taxation of Distributions from Accumulation Trusts: The
Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 52 NoTRE DAME LAW. 611 (1977); Zaritsky, The New
Accumulation Trust Rules of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 54 TAxEs 676 (1976). As with all
distributions by a trust, the trustee may consider any amount paid or credited by the trust
within 65 days of the close of its taxable year as properly paid or credited at the close of
such taxable year. I.R.C. § 663(b) (1982). See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
123. See I.R.C. § 666(a) (1982) (no preceeding taxable years).
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their inapplicability to estates as giving disposition by will an im-
portant advantage over disposition by revocable trust.
(k) Trapping Distributions
(1) Distributions in General
The very complexity of Internal Revenue Code Subchapter J
permits a fiduciary who understands it to realize the advantages
and minimize the disadvantages resulting from estate or trust dis-
tributions. For example, an executor or trustee who considers the
effect of the selection of taxable years for the different taxpayers
24
doubtless will select staggered taxable years-fiscal years ending
on the last day of different calendar months. Selecting staggered
taxable years will permit the fiduciary to make distributions from
an estate or trust through one or more intermediary trusts to the
ultimate beneficiary. The tax on these distributions either will not
be payable by the beneficiary,125 or if payable by the beneficiary,
will not be payable for several years.128 The timing of distributions
124. The estate and trust, and any subsidiary trusts, each may elect a fiscal or calen-
dar year without approval of the Commissioner. I.R.C. §§ 442-443 (1982). The first year may
be less than twelve months, and its selection is made by filing the first return. Tress. Reg. §
1.441-1(b)(3), T.D. 7767, 1981-1 C.B. 478.
125. This opportunity arises in distributions during the first taxable year. For exam-
ple, assume an estate that has a July 31 date as its end of fiscal year makes its initial
funding distribution on May 30, 1984, to an interim revocable trust having a June 30 year-
end date. Assume that the distribution carries out a substantial amount of DNI from the
estate. The interim trust will have no DNI for its first fiscal year, ending June 30, 1984.
Accordingly, it can distribute the property to the beneficiary prior to June 30, 1984-or
within the 65 day period established by I.R.C. § 643(c)-without the beneficiary having to
report it as income. The DNI will be taxable to the trust the following year unless distribu-
tions during that year carry out the DNI.
126. A beneficiary reports income from an estate or trust in his taxable year in which
or with which the fiscal or calendar year of the estate or trust ends. For example, assume the
executor selects a fiscal year ending June 30, 1984, and distributes income to the interim
revocable trust on December 31, 1984. Next, assume the interim revocable trust adopts a
fiscal year ending on May 31 and distributes the income immediately to the subsidiary
trusts. These subsidiary trusts, in turn, adopt fiscal years ending on April 30 and immedi-
ately distribute the income to the beneficiaries on December 31, 1984. The income is in-
cluded in the DNI of the interim trust for its taxable year ending May 31, 1985. The income
distributed by that trust to the subsidiary trusts will be included in their DNI for the taxa-
ble year ending April 30, 1986. While the beneficiaries receive the distribution on December
31, 1984, the tax payable is due with their return on April 15, 1987.
Countervailing considerations to staggering estate and trust fiscal years, however, do
exist. The risk of bunching income from two or more years into a single taxable period on
termination is greater with staggered years. See supra note 74. Also, a surviving spouse can
file a joint return with the deceased in the year of death, I.R.C. § 6013 (1982), and may be
able to use the joint return rates for two years thereafter. Id. § 2(a). Deferred income dis-
tributed to the surviving spouse, therefore, may wind up taxable at higher marginal tax
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of appreciated property 7 and of capital gains" '2 is similarly
consequential.
(2) Trapping Distributions
A trapping distribution is a distribution from an estate or rev-
ocable trust to a testamentary or subsidiary trust that removes es-
tate or trust income for income tax purposes, but which constitutes
principal for trust law purposes, and which, therefore, the subsidi-
ary trust need not distribute. Since the income is not distributed
to the income beneficiary, the Code will not currently tax that in-
come to hin.19
Trapping distributions are possible because one of the princi-
pal tenets of Subchapter J is its rejection of a distribution-tracing
concept; with significant exception,130 all distributions of an estate
or trust, whether designated as income or principal, are from DNI
to the extent of DNI. 131 As previously discussed,13 the corollary of
this rule is that distribution of principal as well of income are de-
ductible by the estate or revocable trust to the extent of DNI, and
rates than had the income been taxed to the surviving spouse immediately after the dece-
dent's death.
127. If the grantor trust has DNI when it distributes appreciated property, the benefi-
ciary receives a step up in basis to the fair market value of the distributed property to the
extent the IRS deems the DNI distributed. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f)(3), T.D. 7287, 1973-2
C.B. 210. If a marital share determined by a pecuniary formula is funded with appreciated
property, the distributing estate or trust recognizes gain on the appreciation, limited to the
difference between the value of the property for estate tax purposes and its fair market
value on the date of distribution. Id. § 1.1014-4(a)(3) (1960).
128. The Code does not include capital gains in the trust's DNI, unless they are allo-
cated to income under the trust instrument or unless local law allocates the capital gains to
income and the trustee actually distributes the income to the beneficiaries. LR.C. §
643(a)(3) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-3(a). Since capital gains are no longer subject to
throwback, the beneficiaries can avoid tax liability on the trust's capital gains. If the benefi-
ciaries have capital losses or capital loss carryovers that otherwise would expire, however,
the grantor trust simply could distribute the capital gains with a designation that the distri-
bution represents capital gains of the trust for the current year.
129. See Cornfeld, Trapping Distributions, 14 INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 14 (1980); Giles,
The Application of Certain Rules of Federal Income Taxation: Bracket Splitting, Multiple
Trusts, Trapping Distributions and Basis Adjustments, 37 INST. ON FED. TAx'N ch. 40
(1979).
130. I.R.C. § 663(a)(1) (1982); see supra note 63.
131. Certain qualifications to the general statement contained in the text are created
by carving out exceptions from the term "distribution" to which the distribution rules of
Subchapter J apply. For instance, a distribution does not include a specific bequest or gift of
property that the trustee pays, pursuant to the terms of the governing instrument, all at
once or in not more than three installments. See LR.C. § 663(b) (1982); see also id. § 662(a)
(providing for some elements of tracing).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
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distributions of principal as well as of income are includible in the
income of the recipientto the extent of the beneficiaries' allocated
share of DNI. Accordingly, when income and principal benefi-
ciaries each received distributions in the same year, the Code allo-
cates a portion of the current year's DNI to both income and prin-
cipal beneficiaries.3 3
Harkness v. United States13 4 illustrates the potential for mis-
chief this rule permits. In Harkness the decedent's widow was to
receive fifty percent of the income of the estate. For the taxable
year in question, the executor made distributions to the widow of
both principal and income of over $27,467,000. These distributions
represented seventy-six percent of the total principal and income
distributions to all beneficiaries. Thus, even though her total dis-
tributions included only one-half of the estate's current income
($206,000), she was liable for the taxes on seventy-six percent, not
fifty percent, of the estate's $826,758 of DNI for the year. This
occasioned an income tax liability to her of $188,000.31 The Court
of Claims, in upholding the Commissioner's imposition of this tax
liability, stated:
If discretionary "balancing" payments which include large amounts of corpus
are made and accepted, as here, the necessary consequence is to invoke the
formula nonetheless, and the taxpayer will not be allowed to "trace" in order
to show that the source of part of his receipts was in fact not "distributable
133. I.R.C. § 662(a) (1982). Although the general rule for Subchapter J is to allocate
DNI ratably among the recipients of property that attract DNI, this rule is subject to two
qualifications when the trustee makes income and principal distributions in the same year.
First, when the trustee distributes income and principal from an estate or trust in the same
year to different beneficiaries, those beneficiaries to whom the trust requires current income
distributions are allocated all DNI to the extent of required distributions. Id. § 662(a)(1).
All other beneficiaries report any residual DNI on a ratable basis. Id. § 662(a)(2). Second,
when a trustee distributes income and principal from an estate or trust in the same year to a
beneficiary that is a trust, the IRS allows the trust to deduct, in computing its taxable
income, amounts that it, in turn, distributes to its beneficiaries up to the amount of its DNL
The trust's DNI will include the DNI originally allocated to it by virtue of distributions
from the estate or trust. Thus, if a trust receiving income and principal in the same year
distributes that income, then the DNI allocated initially to the trust will be reallocated to
the income beneficiaries up to the lower of the trust's DNI or the amounts distributed.
When the trustee makes distributions of principal and income to a simple trust from an
estate or interim trust during the same taxable year, the result will not be a truly ratable
allocation of DNI among the principal and income. Rather, the result will be similar to the
"tier one" allocation to current income beneficiaries under I.R.C. § 662. The trustee must
consider this factor in making distributions of principal to a subsidiary trust. If the subsidi-
ary trust is to be a significant separate taxpayer for purposes of reporting tax liability, dis-
tributions of income from the subsidiary trust will defeat that purpose dollar for dollar by
deflecting liability for DNI to its own income beneficiary.
134. 469 F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
135. The widow's total tax liability including interest was almost $250,000.
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net income" but corpus. If the tax consequences of this approach are deemed
sufficiently undesirable, there is the other route which can and should be
taken. In these circumstances, there is no compulsion to accept an unfair or
unrealistic division of "distributable net income." 136
Due to the throwback rules, trapping distributions by revoca-
ble trusts are less advantageous than trapping distributions by an
estate. Although the throwback rules generally do not apply to
simple trusts-those that must distribute all income cur-
rently-they do apply to a simple trust to the extent that it has
"outside income. ' 13 7 In the case of a trapping distribution from a
revocable trust, a simple subsidiary trust has outside income when
it receives principal amounts from the revocable trust that attract
DNI from the distributing revocable trust. Thus, when a revocable
trust makes a trapping distribution, the trapped DNI automati-
cally becomes "outside income," and a later distribution by the
subsidiary trust will occasion a throwback tax. Thus, trapping dis-
tributions to a simple subsidiary trust from a revocable trust are
ladened with the complexities and uncertainties of the throwback
rules operating upon a later distribution.138
When an estate makes a trapping distribution of principal to a
simple trust, the definition of "outside income" is more restrictive.
Thus, a throwback calculation will not be required if the simple
trust later distributes that principal except to the extent that the
trapped DNI included either "income in respect of a decedent" or
constituted unrealized accounts receivable assigned to the trust.1 3'
136. Harkness, 469 F.2d at 321.
137. The Regulations state that "the term 'outside income' means amounts that are
included in the distributable net income of the trust for the year but are not 'income' of the
trust as that term is defined in § 1.643(b)-l"--for example, "[d]istributions from another
trust that include distributable net income or undistributed net income of such other trust."
Trees. Reg. § 1.665(e)-lA(b) (1972); see I.R.C. § 643(b) (1982); Tress. Reg. § 1.643(b)-i.
138. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.665(e)-lA(b) (1972). See LR.C. § 643(b) (1982); Tress. Reg. §
1.643(b)-i. Except for income in respect of a decedent under § 691 and unrealized accounts
receivable assigned to the trust, amounts received from an estate, for which § 661(a) allowed
the estate a deduction, are not outside income items. Neither the Code nor the Regulations
attempt specific definition of "income in respect of a decedent" (IRD). See Treas. Reg. §
1.691(a)-1(b), T.D. 6808, 1965-1 C.B. 257. Cases have referred to the concept in a variety of
ways, including: items that would have been taxable as income to the decedent had he lived
to receive them, see, e.g., Estate of Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937 (Ct. CL.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); items "accrued" in broad, not technical, sense at death, see,
e.g., Estate of Riegelman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1958); and items attributa-
ble to activities of decedent during his lifetime and not to activities of the estate or benefi-
ciary, see, e.g., Keck v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 313 (1968), rev'd, 415 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.
1969). A legally enforceable right to items by decedent is not a prerequisite. See O'Daniel's
Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949). See generally M. FERGUSON, J. FREE-
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A trapping distribution from an estate to a simple trust that does
not include either of the two designated types of "outside income"
will not occasion a throwback calculation upon a later distribution
from the simple trust. The simple trust, therefore, can become the
permanent taxpayer with respect to the accumulated amount of
trapped DNI received from the estate. The uncertainties inherent
in the throwback contingencies do not affect the estate executor's
ability to employ effectively the trapping distribution strategem.
The ability of an estate to make trapping distributions results in a




The nontax advantages of the revocable trust doubtlessly jus-
tify its popularity as an estate planning technique. Perhaps in part
due to the realization that these advantages are not tax-related,
estate planners popularly perceive the revocable trust as essen-
tially "neutral" from a tax perspective, upon establishment and
during administration for the periods prior to and following the
grantor's death. Under this perception, the revocable trust seems
to be an innocuous alternative to disposition by will.
The purpose of this Article has been to examine this percep-
LAND, & R. STPHENS, supra note 67, ch. 4. The Code taxes IRD upon receipt by the estate
or other beneficiary unless the recipient transfers the right to IRD prior to the receipt.
I.R.C. § 691(a)(2) (1982). The income retains the same character in recipient's hands that it
had in decedents hands. Id. § 691(a)(3); Rev. Rul. 64-150, 1964-1 C.B. 448 (sick pay). The
Code allows the recipient income tax deductions for estate tax attributable to IRD. IRD
does not receive new basis at death. I.R.C. § 1014(c) (1982).
140. When the estate planner makes a decision to utilize a revocable trust as the pri-
mary dispositive instrument, the planner may avoid the disadvantage regarding trapping
distributions by the interim revocable trust to its subsidiary trusts by first "pouring up"
income into the probate estate. If the estate planner does this, the distribution from the
trust to the estate could permit the use of the estate as a separate taxable entity and could
"cleanse" the income so distributed of its throwback taint. No judicial authority exists that
clarifies whether a "pour-up" distribution from a revocable trust to an estate carries DNI
from the trust to the estate. In order for a "pour-up" to carry out DNI to the estate, a
"distribution" must occur. Not all transfers, of course, are "distributions." A transfer of
property from the revocable trust to the estate in response to the exercise of a power by the
executor to demand assets for payment of taxes, debts, and administration expenses is prob-
ably not a "distribution" and, therefore, would not carry out DNI. The demand right, how-
ever, could make the estate subject to income tax liability for the interim trust's taxable
income, including capital gains, under the grantor trust income tax rules of § 678, resulting
in a similar "cleansing" of the trust's income. If, however, transfers are made as a result of
the exercise of the trustee's discretion to sprinkle income among certain beneficiaries includ-
ing the estate, the IRS should view the estate as a beneficiary of the trust, receiving income
distributions that transfer DNI to the estate.
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tion. Having done so, it is apparent that the perception is at once
both correct and incorrect. With few significant exceptions, a
transfer of property to a revocable trust yields, during the gran-
tor's lifetime, only subtle differences in tax consequences from
those that would have resulted had the grantor retained individual
ownership of the trust property. During the period following the
grantor's death, however, many significant differences exist be-
tween the results obtainable had the trust not been established
and the tax results stemming from disposition through revocable
trust. The use of the revocable trust as the principal dispositive
instrument in the estate plan based upon the assumption that the
tax consequences do not differ materially from those obtainable
through testamentary disposition is inappropriate, for the assump-
tion is erroneous and the consequences are potentially serious.
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